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1 Introduction
What impact will Brexit have on the decision-making 
processes and output of the European Union? While much 
has been said about the possible efects of Brexit for the 
UK, and for the economic relations between the EU27 
and the UK, there still exists little systematic analysis of the 
possible efects on the functioning of EU decision-making 
institutions. Losing one of its major member states – in 
terms of population, economic and military power – is likely 
to have important consequences for which policies that will 
be taken and how. his is true in particular with regards 
to the Council of the EU, the primary intergovernmental 
institution in everyday EU decision-making.
We approach this question in two ways in this report. he 
irst approach we adopt is to focus on the likely impact on 
decision outcomes in the legislative procedures. We examine 
331 controversial issues in the recent past in which the UK 
was a member. Our data in this part of the report is based on 
interviews with participants in the decision-making process, 
and includes information on the positions and salience 
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of member states, the Commission and the European 
Parliament. It stems from the Decision-Making in the 
European Union (DEU) project, and refers mainly to the 
periods of 1998-2000 and 2004-2008. he latter period is 
more representative of the current EU of 28 member states, 
and we devote most attention to the analysis of this part 
of the dataset. We ask whether the decision outcomes on 
these issues would have been diferent had the UK not been 
a member. We estimate the proportion of issues on which 
the outcomes would likely have been diferent without the 
involvement of the UK, and for those issues on which the 
outcomes are likely to have been diferent, by how much 
and in what respect. In estimating the outcome we consider 
diferent models of decision-making – a Procedural model 
and a Bargaining model – which make diverse assumptions 
regarding the modes of interaction and the role of formal 
procedural institutions, based on previous research on 
decision-making in the Council. 
he second approach we adopt is to study the impact 
of Brexit on the cooperation networks of member state 
representatives in the Council preparatory bodies. hese 
are the committees and working groups that prepare the 
ministers’ decisions and in practice perform the bulk of 
the negotiations in the Council. We ask whether and how 
Brexit is likely to afect the cooperation networks in 11 
committees and working groups, including the most high-
ranking committees. Our data is based on two surveys of 
member state representatives carried out in 2012 and 2015, 
including in total 474 respondents from all member states. 
he respondents were asked which other member states they 
cooperate with most often. On the basis of this information 
we calculate three diferent network centrality measures – 
degree, closeness and betweenness – which address both 
direct and indirect cooperation patterns. We subsequently 
compare the network centrality of member states in a 
situation where the UK is included in the network to their 
centrality when the UK is removed from the network.
With regards to policy outcomes, we ind that regardless of 
which decision-making model we use the impact of Brexit 
is relatively modest. In the Procedural model, depending on 
the decision-making rule and the number of member states, 
we ind that 90-95 per cent of the cases would have had 
the same outcome even if the UK had been absent. In the 
Bargaining model, removing an actor always changes the 
outcome (if that actor is not indiferent to the outcome). 
However, we ind that the size of the efect of removing 
the UK is fairly small, on average about 4 scale points on 
a policy scale that ranges from 0 to 100. he direction of 
the (relatively modest) impact points towards legislative 
outcomes with more regulations and higher subsidies. 
However, we ind no signiicant diference with regards 
to more or less European integration. Furthermore, we 
ind that Sweden was the member state (followed by the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark) that had the same (or 
a similar) position as the UK most often in the issues we 
study. Southern European states, such as Spain, Greece and 
Italy, had the least number of positions in common with 
the UK. It is no surprise, therefore, that we ind that the 
direction of the (relatively modest) impact of Brexit on 
legislative outcomes is to the advantage of Spain, but to the 
disadvantage of Sweden.
he network analyses also indicate that Sweden, along with 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark, is among those 
member states that stand out as being particularly afected 
by Brexit, both when considering direct and indirect ties. 
hese states have strong direct ties (degree) with the UK, 
which they are not able to compensate by easily accessible 
indirect ties (closeness) when the UK is taken out of the 
network. We also ind that the positions of some member 
states as intermediary players in the network, bridging 
the gaps between more distant actors, are strengthened 
by Brexit. his includes in particular the larger states, 
Germany, France and Poland. hese states are therefore 
likely to become more central to the information lows in 
the network. At the committee level, we ind that Brexit 
may impact the Council committees and working groups 
towards less eicient networks. he UK has been a central 
actor in many committees and working groups. When 
such an actor disappears the distances (average path length) 
between the remaining states increase, unless they are able 
to compensate the loss with new ties. 
2  The impact of Brexit on legislative 
outcomes
he irst approach we adopt to addressing the question of the 
impact of Brexit is to focus on the likely efect on decision 
outcomes in the legislative arena. We examine controversial 
issues in the recent past in which the UK was obviously a 
member. We ask whether the decision outcomes on these 
issues would have been diferent had the UK not been a 
member. We estimate the proportion of issues on which 
the outcomes would likely have been diferent without the 
involvement of the UK, and for those issues on which the 
outcomes are likely to have been diferent, by how much 
and in what respect.
When conducting this analysis, we use the best available 
dataset that describes speciic controversies that were raised 
in the EU between 1998 and 2008. he dataset, which is 
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known as the Decision-making in the EU or DEU dataset, 
has been used in a large number of peer reviewed publications 
in recent years (homson et al. 2006; 2012). he dataset 
examines 125 legislative proposals that were discussed in the 
EU during the period 1998-2008. he selected proposals 
were discussed mainly in the period 1998-2000, in which 
there were 15 member states, and in the period 2004-2008, 
during which the EU enlarged from 25 to 27 member states. 
his latter period is more representative of the current EU 
of 28 member states and we devote most attention to the 
analysis of this part of the dataset.
Each of the 125 legislative proposals were examined in 
detail to describe the main controversial issues that were 
raised and the policy alternatives favoured most by each 
of the member states, as well as the Commission and the 
European Parliament where relevant. he dataset contains 
information on 331 controversial issues in total, since each 
proposal raised on average between two and three main 
controversial issues. Semi-structured interviews with key 
informants or experts were conducted to describe the issues 
and the positions of the actors. Two teams of researchers 
held over 350 semi-structured interviews over a 10-year time 
span to gather the required information. he informants 
were participants in the decision-making processes. Most 
were oicials from the permanent representations or the 
primarily responsible oicials in the Commission. 
he dataset describes each of the controversial issues in a 
standard way to facilitate comparison across issues. his way 
of describing speciic controversies has been used in a wide 
range of previous and related studies. Each controversial 
issue is described as a policy scale ranging from 0 to 100. 
he endpoints represent the most “extreme” positions taken 
by any of the actors or under consideration by the actors. 
he key informants place the intermediate positions on the 
scale to relect the relative political distances between the 
alternatives. he policy scales are comparable in the sense 
that they each relect the range of the bargaining space on 
each controversy. he expert key informants estimated the 
policy alternative most favoured by each of the actors at 
the outset of the negotiations just after the introduction of 
the legislative proposal by the Commission. In addition to 
estimating the positions of each of the actors, the informants 
also estimated the salience of each issue to each actor, again 
on a scale of 0 to 100. 
Figure 1 depicts one of the 331 controversial issues described 
in the DEU dataset. his case refers to a controversial issue 
raised by the proposal to extend the EU’s emission trading 
scheme to aviation activities. he controversy concerned 
the extent to which the auctioning of carbon credits should 
be allowed. he position ranged from those that opposed 
the introduction of auctioning (the 12 actors referred to 
on the left of the igure) to those, including the European 
Parliament, that supported the maximum possible extension 
of the scheme. he actual decision outcome introduced a 
modest amount of auctioning, which our informants placed 
at position 30 on the policy scale. he UK favoured the 
introduction of somewhat more extensive auctioning, and 
was placed at position 50 on the policy scale to represent 
its position. he question is whether the outcome would 
have been substantially diferent if the UK had not been a 
member of the EU when this decision was taken.
he answer to the question of whether and how much the 
UK’s exit will afect decision outcomes depends in part on the 
positions typically taken by the UK representation. Previous 
analyses emphasise that there are no ixed coalitions in the 
Council and that alignments of states are typically formed 
on an issue-by-issue basis. Nevertheless, some patterns 
are clear, and Figure 2 shows a clear tendency in the UK’s 
positions, which corresponds with the conventional wisdom. 
he igure identiies the percentage of the 331 controversial 
issues in the DEU dataset in which the UK takes exactly the 
same position as each of the other actors in the system. For 
comparison, it also shows the percentage of issues on which 
the UK takes a “similar” position, which we deine as being 
20 points or less on our standardised 0-100 policy scales. As 
close observers of EU decision-making would expect, the 
Note: Proposal COD/2006/304. COM: Commission; EP: European 
Parliament; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BU: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: he 
Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland: FR: France; DE: 
Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; 
LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: he Netherlands; PL: 
Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; 
SE: Sweden; UK: he United Kingdom.
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UK’s positions show most similarity with the positions of 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark. he UK’s 
positions show least similarity with the positions of Italy, 
Greece, Spain and the European Parliament. 
he impact of Brexit depends not only on the actors with 
which the UK is typically closest, but also on the process 
through which actors’ positions are transformed into 
decision outcomes in the EU. We apply two alternative 
models of legislative decision-making to investigate the 
impact of Brexit further: a procedural model and a bargaining 
model. We selected these models because they have featured 
prominently in previous analyses of EU decision-making, 
including previous analyses of the DEU dataset. hey also 
ofer quite diferent accounts of the legislative process, 
which enables us to check the robustness of the main 
results. As the name suggests, the procedural model posits 
that the main drivers of decision-making can be found in 
the formal rules of the game. In the context of EU decision-
making, these are the rules laid down in the treaties, which 
specify which actors can introduce proposals, which actors 
can amend proposals and the required levels of support for 
amendments to be successful. By contrast, according to 
the bargaining model we use here, the process is deined 
by informal bargaining, and actors seek a compromise 
outcome following a cooperative process. In the following 
sections, we describe each of these models and the results 
they produce in more detail.
3 The procedural model
he EU treaties have postulated several diferent decision-
making procedures over the years, depending on the 
policy area. In some policy areas unanimity in the Council 
has been required, while in others a qualiied majority of 
member states has been enough to approve a Commission 
proposal. he role of the European Parliament has varied, 
from being only a consultative body to having equal powers 
with the Council. he legislative proposals we analyse have 
been subject to one of three procedures.
First, the simplest of the EU’s legislative procedures is the 
consultation procedure combined with unanimity voting in 
the Council. Here, the Commission introduces a proposal 
and the member states must approve it unanimously. he 
member states may also amend the Commission’s proposal 
by unanimity. he European Parliament is consulted and 
gives an opinion, but neither the Commission nor Council 
is obliged to incorporate the EP’s proposed amendments. 
Secondly, the consultation procedure may also be combined 
with qualiied majority voting (QMV) in the Council. 
Again, the Commission introduces the legislative proposal, 
but now the Council must either approve the proposal with 
a qualiied majority of member states or amend it with the 
support of all member states. he rules for qualiied majority 
voting difer between the EU-15 and the post-2004 periods. 
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a new version of 
QMV. In the EU-15, member states held a total of 87 votes, 
Note: Based on information on 331 controversial issues from the dataset, 
Decision-Making in the EU (homson et al. 2016; homson et al. 2011). 
“Similar” positions are those on which the UK and the relevant actor took 
positions located 20 points or less apart on the standardized 0-100 policy 
scales.
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distributed among them in relation to their population 
sizes, but with small states being overrepresented in relation 
to their population sizes. According to the QMV rule, a 
legislative proposal had to be approved by member states 
with votes that summed to at least 62 of the 87 votes. In the 
enlarged EU in the time period examined here, QMV was 
based on the triple-majority system introduced by the Nice 
Treaty. According to the Nice Treaty rules that governed 
QMV up to 2016, a bill could be adopted by the Council 
of 27 member states if approved by states that together i) 
hold 255 of 345 votes, ii) are at least 14 in number and iii) 
have at least 62 percent of the EU’s total population.
he Lisbon Treaty introduced a new system of QMV in 
the Council. From the year 2014, decisions taken by QMV 
need the approval of 55 percent of member states, 15 of 27 
EU members, that make up 65 percent of the combined 
total of EU states’ populations. To prevent a small number 
of large states from blocking a decision, the population 
criterion only applies if at least four member states are 
against adoption. If only three or fewer states oppose the 
adoption of a bill, the population criterion does not apply, 
even if these states have more than 35 percent of the EU’s 
population. he new system came into efect gradually 
after 2014. In the irst three years after its introduction, 
any member state could request that a decision be taken 
according to the Nice triple-majority rules. 
hird, in the co-decision procedure – which was adjusted 
slightly and renamed the ordinary legislative procedure by 
the Lisbon Treaty – the Commission introduces a proposal 
that must be approved by both the Council and EP. Co-
decision is usually combined with QMV in the Council. 
In the version of the co-decision procedure deined in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, and that applies to all of the co-decision 
cases examined here, the Council and EP formally have 
equal power as co-legislators. In the event of protracted 
disagreements between the Council and EP, a conciliation 
committee composed of representatives of the Council and 
EP is formed. his committee then works on a text that 
must be approved by both the Council and the EP if the 
legislative proposal is to be passed.
When modelling the contemporary co-decision procedure 
we take what is arguably the most literal interpretation of 
the treaty rules regarding the co-decision procedure. Since 
the Council and EP can amend the legislative proposal 
without the approval of the Commission, the Commission 
is excluded from the formal decision-making process. 
Moreover, since the formal rules give equal power to the 
Council and EP, the speciication of the procedural model’s 
prediction should not ascribe an advantage to either of the 
two (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 24-5). 
he concept of pivotal positions is central to all procedural 
models. In models where unanimity is required, the pivotal 
position is that which is closest to the disagreement outcome 
(or reference point). In models where QMV is applied, the 
pivotal position refers to the location of the preference of 
the member state or states that turn a losing minority into 
a blocking minority. 
4  Results of the application of the 
procedural model
More often than not, the procedural model indicates that 
the departure of the UK would not lead to a change in the 
expected decision outcome. he case depicted in Figure 1 
illustrates why this is the case. As mentioned, this proposal 
was subject to the codecision procedure and QMV. Note that 
the 12 states that opposed the introduction of auctioning 
controlled 108 votes and therefore constituted a blocking 
minority. herefore, according to the procedural model, 
this is the decision outcome that should have prevailed. 
he procedural model predicts the decision outcome 
based on a bargain struck between the state or states 
on the pivotal position and the EP under the codecision 
procedure. However, the bargaining space ends when either 
of the actors prefers the status quo to the outcome. In this 
particular case, there is no proposal in the range of positions 
between the pivotal actors and the EP that those pivotal 
actors prefer to the status quo. he pivotal position does 
not change in this case due to the departure of the UK. 
he pivotal actors are still located on the status quo position 
and this is the outcome predicted by the model. he actual 
outcome, however, did involve some shift in policy from 
the status quo, since the legislation adopted introduced a 
modest amount of auctioning in this sector. 
Had the Lisbon rules regarding Council voting applied to 
this case, the procedural model predicts that the outcome 
would have been quite diferent. However, once again, 
the departure of the UK would not have changed the 
outcome according to the model. he 12 member states 
that supported the status quo house less than 21 percent 
of the EU’s population. In number, they are obviously 
also less than the required blocking minority of 13 states 
under the Lisbon rules. With the addition of the nine states 
located on position 20, however, this group becomes a 
large blocking minority under the Lisbon rules. he actors 
located on position 20 are therefore pivotal. he bargaining 
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game between these pivotal actors and the EP results in an 
outcome of 40 on the policy scale. his is the point at which 
this group is indiferent between the compromise proposed 
by the EP and the status quo. he location of the pivotal 
actors and the outcome is the same under the Lisbon rules 
with or without the UK as a member.
here are some cases, however, in which the departure of the 
UK would have led to a diferent outcome according to the 
procedural model. he issue depicted in Figure 3 illustrates 
such a case. he legislative proposal that raised this issue 
was subject to the codecision procedure, and therefore the 
outcome is determined by negotiations between the EP and 
the actors in the pivotal position in the Council according 
to the procedural model. he controversial issue depicted 
in the igure concerns the extent to which the Commission 
should have competencies over non-Community carriers 
when regulating air transport services in Europe. At the 
time of the introduction of this proposal in 2006, the status 
quo was that the Commission did not have competencies 
over non-Community carriers, and although this regulation 
brought other noteworthy changes to the operation of air 
transport services in Europe, it did not change the status 
quo.
Consider irst the prediction of the procedural model based 
on the decision rules that actually applied, which were 
those laid down in the Treaty of Nice, and with the UK as a 
member. he prediction of the procedural model is that the 
status quo would prevail, which is indeed what happened. 
he six member states that favoured the continuation of the 
status quo (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Slovenia 
and the UK) together held 110 of the votes in the Council, 
comfortably exceeding the 91 votes required for a blocking 
minority. Together they make up more than 45 percent of 
the EU’s population. his means that there was no policy 
alternative to the status quo that would be supported by 
a group of member states that meets the voting threshold 
of 255 of the 345 votes and the population threshold of 
62 percent of the population. Note that only 11 of the 
then 27 members took a position on this issue; the other 
16 states were said to be indiferent. We assume that these 
indiferent states behave in such a way that they would not 
interfere with the emerging outcome and place them half 
way between the agenda setter (the EP) and the reference 
point. he decision outcome predicted by the model is the 
same regardless of where we place these indiferent actors.
Suppose, however, that the UK had not been a member of 
the EU in 2006. Would the decision outcome have been 
substantially diferent? According to the procedural model, 
in this particular case the answer is yes. Without the UK, 
the ive member states that support the status quo hold 
only 81 votes. his falls short of the current threshold of 
91 votes for a blocking minority. We assume that without 
the UK the threshold for passing a law under QMV would 
have been maintained at 74 percent of the total qualiied 
majority votes in the Council, amounting to 234 of the 
remaining 316 votes. his implies that a blocking minority 
would have been set at 83 votes or more. he ive member 
states that support the status quo would still have been a few 
votes short of this lower blocking minority threshold of 83 
votes. hese ive member states have 37.84 percent of the 
EU’s total population without the UK, and are therefore 
also just short of the required blocking minority in terms of 
population size of 38 percent of the EU’s population. It is 
only with the addition of Italy, which took a somewhat more 
conciliatory position to the extension of the Commission’s 
competencies to non-Community carriers, that this group 
is able to muster a blocking minority. his means that Italy, 
which takes position 20 on the policy scale, becomes the 
QMV pivot in a scenario in which the UK is not a member 
of the EU. According to the logic of the procedural model, 
the outcome is then a negotiation between the EP and Italy. 
he model speciies that the bargaining space ends when 
either one of the actors is indiferent between the outcome 
and the reference point. In this case, at position 40, Italy is 
indiferent between the outcome and the reference point. 
So the prediction of the procedural model is that without 
the UK, the decision outcome would have been position 40. 
his outcome represents the granting of substantially more 
powers to the Commission over non-Community carriers 
than was actually adopted.Note: Proposal COD/2006/130.
FIGURE 3  ONE OF THE MAIN 
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he alignment of actors depicted in this case is less sensitive 
to the departure of the UK if we assume that the Lisbon 
double-majority rules apply. In that scenario, the member 
states that supported the status quo have a blocking minority 
either with or without the UK, as these states have more 
than 35 percent of the EU’s population. Consequently, the 
prediction of the procedural model is that the status quo 
would prevail either with or without the UK as a member.
It is also possible, although a rare occurrence, that the exit 
of the UK leads to a predicted outcome that is somewhat 
closer to the UK’s position according to the logic of the 
procedural model. Figure 4 depicts such a counterintuitive 
case. he controversial issue concerns the reduction in 
ishing opportunities near Mauritania as part of a partnership 
agreement with that territory. he legislative proposal was 
subject to the consultation procedure and qualiied majority 
voting in the Council. Only member states with substantial 
ishing interests took positions on this issue. Five member 
states (Greece, Latvia, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) wanted 
to maintain the status quo with respect to the availability of 
ishing opportunities. However, these ive member states 
held only 63 votes and made up less than 16 percent of the 
EU’s population, and therefore did not constitute a blocking 
minority. Only with the addition of Poland and the UK, 
both of which favoured some modest reduction in the level 
of ishing opportunities, did these actors constitute a blocking 
minority. With the addition of both Poland and the UK, this 
group of actors held 119 votes and over 35 percent of the EU’s 
population. Note that with Poland alone this group holds 
only 90 votes and is therefore still one short of a blocking 
minority. he UK’s position was estimated to be at point 
30 on the policy scale, which makes this position pivotal. 
According to the procedural model, the Commission will 
pitch its proposal so that the proposal is as close as possible to 
its own preference, while making the pivotal actors indiferent 
between the status quo and the proposal. his means that 
the model’s prediction is position 60 on the policy scale. In 
fact, our key informants placed the actual outcome closer to 
the Commission’s preference, locating it at position 80 on 
the policy scale. his indicates that the inal act embodied a 
substantial reduction in ishing opportunities.
Now suppose that the UK had not been a member of the 
EU in 2008 while similar decision rules had applied. he 
procedural model now predicts a decision outcome at 
position 40 rather than 60, which is somewhat closer to 
the UK’s preferred position. In this scenario, the ive states 
that support the status quo plus Poland would constitute 
a blocking minority. hey hold 90 votes. Although this is 
one short of the blocking minority threshold that actually 
applied, it is reasonable to assume that the threshold in 
terms of the number of votes would have been reduced had 
the UK not been a member. As noted above, it is most likely 
that this threshold would have been reduced to 83 votes 
or more. With this group of six states being the minimum 
blocking minority, Poland’s position at point 20 on the 
scale becomes pivotal. Following the logic of the procedural 
model, the Commission would introduce a proposal such 
that Poland would be indiferent between the proposal and 
the status quo. his is position 40 on the policy scale.
he application of the procedural model based on the 
Lisbon rules to this alignment of actors leads to somewhat 
diferent outcomes following the departure of the UK. As 
above, with the UK as a member, the minimum blocking 
minority consists of the ive states that support the status 
quo, plus Poland and the UK. Together, these states hold 
just over 35 percent of the EU’s population. herefore, 
as above, the prediction of the model is point 60 on the 
policy scale. However, without the UK as a member, the 
procedural model based on the Lisbon rules generates a 
quite diferent prediction. he ive states that support the 
status quo plus Poland are no longer a blocking minority. 
hey hold less than 27 percent of the total EU population 
without the UK. It is only with the addition of France and 
Italy, which take position 50 on the scale, that this group 
holds a blocking minority. his means that the pivotal 
position is position 50 on the policy scale. his gives the 
Commission a great deal of power to shape the decision 
outcome in line with its own policy preferences. he model 
predicts that the Commission would introduce a proposal 
in line with its own preference at position 100, and that this 
would pass into law.Note: Proposal CNS/2008/0093.
FIGURE 4  ONE OF THE MAIN 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES RAISED 
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OPPORTUNITIES AS PART OF 
A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
WITH MAURITANIA
What are the posions of the actors on the reducon of ﬁshing 
opportunies near Mauritania?
Current integraon                                                                        More integraon
EL, LV, IT, 
NL, ES 
Posion 0: 
Keep current 
opportunies. 
Reference point 
Posion 100: 
Very subtanal 
reducon 
FR, IT
50: Some 
competencies 
20:  30:  
COMDE, IE
Posion 80: 
Subtanal 
reducon. 
Outcome 
PL UK
PAGE 8 . EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 2017:8
due to the fact that the Commission (or the EP in the case 
of codecision) preferred the reference point. As we would 
expect, the results in Table 1 suggest that the exit of the UK 
would have had a greater impact on decision outcomes in 
the EU-15 than in the EU25 or EU27.
We also conducted a supplementary analysis to investigate 
whether the exit of the UK has a greater impact on decision 
outcomes if we assume that the Lisbon rules were used. he 
results, which are contained in Table 2, indicate that this 
is not the case. Again, in the vast majority of issues (95%) 
the predictions of the procedural model with and without 
the UK are identical. hese analyses are limited to the 103 
issues subject to co-decision and QMV to which we could 
apply the procedural model.
5 A bargaining model
We now turn to an alternative model of the legislative decision-
making process, one which posits that decision outcomes are 
reached through compromise and cooperative behaviour. 
his view of the decision-making process is encapsulated 
in the so-called compromise model, which is a irst-order 
approximation of the famous Nash Bargaining Solution. 
hese three cases show the range of efects that Brexit might 
have according to the procedural model. We now turn to 
the summative analyses of all 331 controversial issues in 
the dataset. he procedural model can be applied to 236 
of the 331 controversial issues in the dataset due to the fact 
that not all issues contained the so-called reference point, or 
disagreement outcome on the relevant issue. his might be 
considered a limitation of the model or of the data to which 
the model is applied. he main indings of these summative 
analyses are reported in Table 1.
he headline inding from Table 1 is that on the vast majority 
of cases, the exit of the UK would make no diference to 
decision outcomes according to the logic of the procedural 
model. On only 6 percent of the issues to which we could 
apply the procedural model (13 out of 236 issues) did the 
procedural model generate a diferent prediction with and 
without the UK as a member. his was usually because the 
exclusion of the UK made no diference to the location 
of the pivotal position in the Council. In a slightly larger 
number of cases (8 percent or 19 issues), the exclusion of 
the UK did change the location of the Council pivot, but 
had no efect on the predicted outcome. his was usually 
TABLE 1  THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON DECISION-MAKING USING THE PROCEDURAL MODEL
Process Outcome
Period and 
procedure Same pivot Different pivot Same outcome Different outcome
Amount of change for 
different outcomes. 
Mean (range and s.d.)
EU15
QMV 76 (88%) 10 (12%) 78 (91%) 8 (9%) 46.88 (5-100; 29.75)
Unan. 37 (95%) 2 (5%) 38 (97%) 1 (3%) 40
EU25/7
QMV 96 (93%) 7 (7%) 99 (96%) 4 (4%) 40.00 (20-75; 24.83)
Unan. 8 (100%) 0 (0%) 8 (100%) 0 (0%)
All 217 (92%) 19 (8%) 223 (94%) 13 (6%) 44.23 (5-100; 26.13)
Note: Frequencies and percentages of issues.
Note: Frequencies and percentages of issues. EU25/27 QMV cases.
TABLE 2  THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON POST-ENLARGEMENT QMV ISSUES RE-EXAMINED 
ASSUMING THE LISBON RULES
Process Outcome
QMV rules Same pivot Different pivot Same outcome Different outcome
Amount of change for 
different outcomes. 
Mean (range and s.d.)
Former Nice rules 
(as in Table 1)
96 (93%) 7 (7%) 99 (96%) 4 (4%) 40.00 (20-75; 24.83)
New Lisbon rules 95 (92%) 8 (8%) 98 (95%) 5 (5%) 29.00 (10-40; 13.42)
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When the disagreement outcome is extremely undesirable, 
the Nash Bargaining Solution can be represented in a very 
simple form. As the value that each of the actors attaches to 
the disagreement outcome becomes smaller and smaller, the 
Nash Bargaining Solution approaches a weighted average of 
actors’ positions and at the limit, is identical to the weighted 
average. 
As a formula, this weighted average is simply:




	   

 
  
Where:
outcome is the predicted outcome.
he uppercase letter sigma (∑) is the symbol for the 
summation operator.
salience
i
 is the level of salience that actor i (from the 
set n) attaches to the issue. 
capabilities
i
 is the level of capabilities that actor i 
has over the outcome of the issue. In the following 
analyses we use the log of member states’ population 
sizes (in millions plus one) as an estimate of states’ 
relative capabilities.
preference
i
 is the policy preference of actor i on the 
issue in question.
he compromise model represents a quite diferent view 
of the decision-making process, one which many observers 
would say is more realistic. Indeed, in previous comparative 
assessments of the predictive accuracy of the compromise 
model versus various procedural models, the compromise 
model performed signiicantly better in terms of predictive 
accuracy. Unlike the procedural model, the compromise 
model always generates a decision outcome that lies between 
the most extreme positions taken by any of the actors with 
capabilities. Finally, it is worth noting that the exclusion of 
an actor from the calculations based on the compromise 
model always results in a prediction further from that actor’s 
position as long as the excluded actor takes a position on 
the issue and has a salience score of greater than zero. In our 
analyses, having a position implies a positive salience score.
6  Results of the application of the 
bargaining model
We turn immediately to the summative analyses of all of 
the issues in the DEU dataset rather than dwelling on the 
illustrations, all of which show a slight shift in the predicted 
outcome away from the UK’s preferred outcome. he main 
results are contained in Table 3 and show that the exclusion 
of the UK leads to modest changes to the location of the 
decision outcomes on the majority of issues according to 
the logic of the compromise model. An advantage of the 
compromise model is that it can be applied to all 331 issues 
in the dataset. On 85 percent of these issues (282 of the 331 
issues), the compromise model yields diferent predictions 
if the UK is excluded from the analysis. On the remaining 
15 percent of issues, the UK was indiferent and had no 
position, which means that its exclusion would not afect 
the outcomes. Of the issues on which the exit of the UK 
would have made a diference to the outcome, the size of 
that diference is on average 4.08 points on the 0-100 policy 
scales.
While the magnitude of these changes is small, the results 
depicted in Figure 5 indicate that there is a clear pattern in 
many but not all respects. First, the outcomes predicted by 
the compromise model without the UK are not signiicantly 
more pro-integration than its predictions with the UK 
included. Second, the outcomes predicted without the 
UK are signiicantly more regulatory than the outcomes 
predicted with the UK. hird, the outcomes predicted 
without the UK involve higher subsidies than the outcomes 
predicted with the UK. 
here are also patterns concerning the location of the 
predicted outcomes in relation to other member states 
positions. Outcomes without the UK will be signiicantly 
closer to the positions of the Spanish delegation. his 
accords with the observation discussed above that the 
UK’s positions are generally furthest from the Spanish 
positions. By contrast, decision outcomes without the UK 
will be signiicantly further from the positions taken by the 
Swedish delegation according to the compromise model. 
Finally, although obvious, it is worth noting that decision 
outcomes without the UK will be signiicantly further from 
the UK’s preferred positions.
TABLE 3  THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON 
DECISION-MAKING OUTCOMES 
USING A BARGAINING MODEL
Period and 
procedure
Same 
outcomes
Different 
outcomes
Amount of change for 
different outcomes. 
Mean (range and s.d.)
EU15
QMV 10 (9%) 104 (91%) 4.45 (.01 – 12.59; 3.25)
Unan. 11 (19%) 48 (81%) 5.29 (.13 – 20.71; 4.35)
EU25/7
QMV 25 (17%) 120 (83%) 3.41 (.01 – 18.23; 3.38)
Unan. 3 (23%) 10 (77%) 2.63 (.63 – 8.89; 2.38)
All 49 (15%) 282 (85%) 4.08 (.01 – 20.71; 3.55)
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7  The impact of Brexit on cooperation 
networks
Besides its impact on decision outcomes in the legislative 
arena, we explore the impact of the exit of the UK on the 
cooperative relationships among the EU member states in 
the Council. In this section, we examine how Brexit, as a 
disruption in the EU collaborative networks, may afect 
remaining EU members and their cooperative interactions 
in the diferent committees and working groups that 
prepare the decisions of the minsters. Information on the 
network relations among member state representatives 
in these committees and worksing groups was obtained 
through a survey of oicials from the representations of 
all member states to the EU in Brussels. Over the years, 
ive such surveys have been conducted, in 2003, 2006, 
2009, 2012 and 2015, including interviews with in total 
1093 member state representatives (Naurin, Johansson 
and Lindahl 2016). he data has been used extensively 
in previous research to analyse negotiations and decision-
making in the Council (see, for example, Naurin 2015, 
Johansson 2015, Häge and Naurin 2013, Naurin and 
Lindahl 2010, Naurin 2010, Arregui and homson 2009). 
In this report, we base our analyses on the two most recent 
surveys, in 2012 and 2015.
All representatives in eleven selected committees and 
working groups in the Council were approached for the 
interviews. Both high-level committees and lower-level 
working groups were included, involving a broad range of 
policy areas, ranging from economic policy, agricultural 
policy, foreign and security policy, environmental policy, 
competition and internal market policy, to tax policy and 
justice and home afairs.1 he interviews were conducted by 
telephone. he response rate was 84% in 2012 and 73% in 
2015. In 2012, 249 member states were interviewed, and in 
2015, the number of respondents was 225. 
In all three surveys, the following question was asked: 
“Which member states do you most often cooperate with 
within your working group, in order to develop a common 
position?” On the basis of the respondents’ answers to this 
question, we identify the network relations between member 
states. he question posed focuses respondents’ attention on 
direct contacts with people from other member states in 
their working groups. Respondents were free to list other 
member states with which they cooperated, and typically 
mentioned between three and ive others. heir answers 
revealed interesting patterns of cooperation evolution for 
each surveyed committee.
1 he preparatory bodies include Coreper 1, Coreper 2, the Political Security Committee (PSC), the Special 
Committee on Agriculture (SCA), the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), the Politico-Military Group (PMG), 
the Working Party on Tax Questions, the Coordinating committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (CATS), the Working Party on Agricultural Questions, the Working Party on Competitiveness and 
Growth, and the Working party on the Environment. 
FIGURE 5 THE DIRECTIONAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON DECISION OUTCOMES
Note: Positive values (greater than zero) indicate outcomes that bring more integration, more regulation, and higher subsidies, as well as outcomes that are 
closer to the Spanish positions, and further from the Swedish and UK positions.
Circles refer to the average impact of Brexit. Bars represent the 95% conidence intervals. Diamonds refer to the minimum and maximum values of the 
efect found in the DEU issues.
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Figure 6 presents the cooperation networks of Coreper 
I and Coreper II in 2012 and 2015. he UK and its 
cooperative ties are highlighted in the igure. It is clear, 
however, that a simple visual inspection of the complex 
collaborative networks among the states in the Council 
preparatory bodies will not go far in terms of understanding 
of the impact of Brexit. herefore, we will now turn to the 
calculation of network centrality measures. We approach 
this question by irstly distinguishing between direct and 
indirect cooperation ties and highlight three types of 
important players. 
8  Direct and indirect impacts of Brexit on 
cooperative network relations
Direct collaborative ties perhaps are the most intuitive 
and important form of cooperation. Partners in a direct 
cooperative relationship can easily exchange information 
and bargain with each other, which in turn is of critical 
importance to the emergence of consensus. herefore, an 
eicient collaborative network is usually associated with 
dense direct cooperative ties. Although direct ties are 
highly desirable in facilitating communal cooperation and 
consensus, its initiation and maintenance can be quite costly 
(e.g., time costs). In such contexts as the EU Council, the 
development of direct cooperative relationships is further 
constrained by political factors. Our earlier study reveals 
that the EU member states tend to choose their direct 
partners in a strategic way, and that the overall density of 
direct cooperative ties has stabilized at a relatively low level 
(Huhe, Naurin and homson 2017).
However, a relative sparsity of direct cooperative ties does 
not necessarily entail an ineicient network. To acquire 
valuable information or to reach consensus, players can 
resort to a less-recognized relationship, that is, indirect 
ties (or brokerage ties). For instance, actors with relatively 
modest resources can rely on a popular or central player 
who can help facilitate information exchange and policy 
FIGURE 6 COOPERATION NETWORK IN COREPER I AND COREPER II
(a) Coreper I (2012, 2015, and combined)
(b) Coreper II (2012, 2015, and combined)
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compromise. In fact, the more modest the resources, the 
more a member state might need to rely on an intermediate 
player to reach some unfamiliar and remote partners. 
Indirect ties, therefore, is a key mechanism by which some 
disconnected and remote member states can interact with 
each other. On the other hand, the intermediate players not 
only can serve as a mediator – resolving disagreement and 
possible conlicts – they can also beneit from information, 
opportunities, or knowledge that low across the indirect 
ties.2
A thorough assessment of Brexit’s impact on the collaborative 
networks in the EU Council, therefore, require us to explore 
both direct and indirect cooperative ties systematically. 
Speciically, we intend to answer three questions. (1) What 
is the direct impact of Brexit to cooperation in the EU 
Council? (2) Could disconnected and dissimilar member 
states still easily acquire information and interact with each 
other (indirect impact)? (3) After the UK exits as a central 
actor in the network, will the relative importance of other 
intermediate players increase?
9 Country-level statistics and comparisons
To answer these questions, we irst focus on three key network 
statistics at the state-level; degree centrality, closeness, and 
betweenness. he three hypothetical cooperation graphs in 
Figure 7 provides an illustration of how these three statistics 
capture important changes to direct partners, remote 
partners, and intermediate players respectively.
Degree centrality. Figure 7.a illustrates the direct impact of 
Brexit on UK’s close partners. In this example, Brexit tends 
to directly afect the three countries in red (i.e., SE, DK, and 
IE), while the other two countries in grey (i.e., FR and DE) 
remain unafected. Beyond the changes in their partnership, 
what is more important are the changes in member states’ 
relative positions in the group. Originally, DK enjoys three 
direct partners as FR and DE do. However, after removing 
the UK from Figure 7.a, DK has only two direct partners, 
indicating a relative decline of importance comparted to 
FR and DE. Similarly, SE and IE also sufer from losses 
in relative importance, particularly when comparing to FR 
and DE. To capture these changes, we employ the measure 
of degree centrality. he basic idea is that member states’ 
centrality in the cooperation network helps reveal their 
relative positions in the Council, and central states are those 
who have the most cooperative ties with other member 
states.
Closeness. he degree centrality of a member state is 
determined merely by the number of its direct partners, and 
thus cannot relect potential indirect impacts of Brexit on 
remote partners. hese are better captured by the measure 
of closeness, as depicted in Figure 7.b. Here we irst take SE 
as our focus state (in black). After Brexit we ind that SE 
has only one direct partner, FR (in grey), rather than two as 
when the UK is in the network. Moreover, SE also sufers 
a negative indirect impact to one of its remote partners, 
IE. Figure 7.b. shows that SE has three potential remote 
2 A realpolitik version of intermediate players is a power broker, who beneits from side parties’ ongoing conlict, 
sometimes by putting one side against another, other times by seizing opportunities the others ignore in the heat of 
their own battle.
FIGURE 7 AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS OF BREXIT
Note: Countries in black are our focus under a speciic type of relationship; countries in red are negatively afected by removing UK; blue countries are 
unafected; and countries in grey are irrelevant to the relationship of interest.
(a) direct partners degree (b) remote partners closeness (c) intermediate players betweenness
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partners (i.e., DK, DE, and IE), i.e. actors with whom SE 
has no direct contact. Originally, SE can reach all these 
three remote partners via short two-step connections (i.e., 
SE-FR-DK, SE-FR-DE, SE-UK-IE, ). However, UK’s exit 
from the group would make the indirect short link SE-UK-
IE impossible. SE now has no other choice but to resort 
to a longer and less eicient three-step connection to reach 
IE (i.e., SE-FR-DE-IE). he exact same loss of both direct 
and indirect connection applies to IE, while FR and DE are 
unafected in this respect. DK, on the other hand, while 
losing a direct partner, the distance to its remote partners 
SE and IE are still only two steps away (DK-FR-SE, DK-
DE-IE).
his example illustrates that loss in direct partnership 
does not necessarily entail a loss in closeness. It is this 
particular feature that makes many collaborative networks 
quite resilient against the removal of a partner. Closeness 
centrality focuses on how close a member state is to all other 
members in the Council. he idea is that a member state 
is central if it can quickly interact with all other member 
states. In other words, states with a small total network 
distance are considered as more important than those with 
a high total distance. We quantify closeness by surveying all 
the shortest paths between member states (i.e., geodesics).
Betweenness. As hinted in our elaboration of closeness, UK’s 
exit from the group is likely to strengthen the immediate 
roles of some other member states. A typical case here is 
FR in Figure 7.c (in black). (DE is occupying a mirroring 
spot and thus enjoys the same position as FR in this regard.) 
First, consider the indirect contact between SE and IE. 
After removing the UK, SE and IE have to rely on FR to 
acquire information about each other (i.e., from SE-UK-IE 
to SE-FR-DE-IE). In this process, the importance of FR 
has been increased as an intermediate player. Second, FR’s 
intermediate role is further strengthened in the indirect 
relationship between SE and DK. While originally the two 
states can rely on two channels to reach each other (i.e., SE-
UK-DK and SE-FR-DK), after UK’s exit they would depend 
solely on FR. Analytically, we use betweenness to capture 
the changes to intermediate players. We use the number of 
times a member state acts as a bridge along the shortest path 
between two other states to quantify betweenness.
In sum, the three network statistics – degree centrality, 
closeness, and betweenness – help reveal important changes 
to direct partners, remote partners, and intermediate players 
after Brexit. In the forthcoming empirical estimations, we 
generalize the above analysis to the Council surveyed in 
2012 and 2015. We calculate the three statistics for each 
member state before and after removing UK from the 22 
committee and working group networks. Paired t-tests 
are used to test the signiicance of the impact of Brexit to 
individual member states.
Figure 8 presents our analysis of degree centrality. Member 
states are ordered by the average post-Brexit degree centrality 
as aggregated over all committees and working groups in 
the surveys from 2012 and 2015. At least three important 
indings stand out. First, the paired t-tests suggest that over 
half of the remaining member states (i.e., 15 out of 27) are 
substantially and signiicantly afected. his is a result of the 
fact that the UK has been an active and central member 
state, with many direct ties to other members. Second, a 
closer look at these signiicantly afected countries suggests 
that they tend to be central and well-connected actors in 
the group. Speciically, the top eight most well-connected 
countries all sufer from signiicant loss in direct partnership 
when the UK leaves. hird and inally, we ind that SE, NL, 
DK, and IE are likely to sufer the most after Brexit. In 
contrast for member states such as Austria, Belgium, Greece 
and Spain, the impacts of Brexit on their direct partnership 
are negligible.
We then turn to indirect impacts of Brexit and compare 
changes in the closeness centrality of EU member states. 
FIGURE 8  COUNTRY-BASED COMPARISON 
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Compared to the broad direct impacts, Brexit exerts a 
more limited impact on member states’ abilities to reach 
remote partners. Speciically, paired t-tests show that only 
nine members are likely to be negatively and signiicantly 
afected by Brexit with respect to closeness. he decline 
in the number of countries that are signiicantly afected 
suggests that the existence of dense indirect cooperative ties 
in the EU Council could mitigate the shock entailed by 
Brexit. Second, a scrutiny of countries whose closeness are 
signiicantly undermined reveals that, again, SE, NL, DK, 
IE and MT are more severely afected by the UK’s exit from 
the EU Council. his in turn suggests that these countries 
not only have had strong direct ties with the UK, but also 
have relied heavily on the UK to reach other member states 
in various committees. 
Finally, we examine the changes to the betweenness centrality. 
First, we observe much larger variations in member states’ 
betweenness than in degree centrality or closeness. his 
suggests that member states in the Council rely heavily 
on a few intermediate players (in particular FR, DE, and 
PL) to reach other remote partners. Second, and consistent 
with our expectation, the intermediate roles of these central 
players are further strengthened by UK’s exit from the EU 
Council. We ind that eight countries’ betweenness scores 
have been signiicantly increased. Among these eight states, 
the positions of FR, DE, and PL would be particularly 
enhanced.
In conclusion, our analysis of three key network statistics 
at the country level reveal that the impacts of Brexit on the 
collaborative networks in the EU Council are complex. 
Because the UK has been a central actor in many committees 
and working groups Brexit introduces large changes to the 
other states’ direct partnership. Yet, the indirect impacts of 
Brexit seem to be two-folded. On the one hand, thanks to 
the dense indirect cooperative ties, a smaller number of states 
would sufer from signiicant loss in closeness. Particularly, 
MT, SE, NL, IE and DK tend to be vulnerable after the 
UK’s exit from the EU Council. On the other hand, the 
positions of remaining key intermediate players (i.e., FR, 
DE, and PL) have been signiicantly enhanced.
10  Committee-level statistics and 
comparisons
While the above country-level statistics can capture changes 
to individual member states, they are limited in revealing 
overall changes at the network level. We therefore calculate 
and compare two network-level statistics of the EU 
committees; network density and average path length.
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Network density. Network density can be interpreted as 
the aggregate measure of degree centrality at the country 
level. It describes the portion of the potential direct ties 
in a network that are actual connections. A “potential 
connection” is a connection that could potentially exist 
between two countries – regardless of whether or not it 
actually does. In light of this, network density relects 
the overall level of direct partnership in a given network. 
Figure 11 then presents the average network densities of the 
11 committees surveyed in 2012 and 2015. 
First, we ind moderate levels of network densities across 
the 11 committees. he overall network density stabilizes 
under 0.20, which conirms our earlier discussion that 
direct partnership tends to be costly and strategic. It should 
be noted, however, that our wording in the survey question 
might underestimate the actual density of cooperative ties 
in the EU Council. his is so because we only asked for the 
member states with which the respondent “cooperate most 
often”. However, this possible underestimation of density 
does not afect our conclusion about the relative changes 
associated with Brexit. 
Second, Brexit tends to afect EU committees signiicantly 
and variably. In working groups and committees where the 
UK has been a particularly central actor (i.e. the UK has had 
a high degree centrality) Brexit will lead to lower density. 
Particularly, the Working Party on the Environment (Env), 
the Working Party on Tax Questions (Tax), the Political 
Security Committee (PSC), and the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) would become signiicantly sparser after 
the UK’s exit. In the Special Committee on Agriculture 
(SCA), on the other hand, where the UK has a lower than 
average degree, the post-Brexit network will not experience 
a decrease in density.
Average path length. In a sparse yet locally clustered network, 
cooperation could still be eicient if dissimilar members 
could reach each other easily. We thus examine the average 
path length, which, to a certain degree, can be regarded 
as an aggregate measure of closeness. he basic idea is to 
capture the number of actors you will have to communicate 
through, on an average, to contact a remote actor. More 
speciically, average path length is quantiied as the average 
number of steps along the shortest paths for all possible 
CP1=Coreper 1, CP2=Coreper 2, PSC=Political Security Committee, 
SCA=Special Committee on Agriculture, EPC=Economic Policy 
Committee, PMG=Politico-Military Group, Tax=Working Party on 
Tax Questions, Jus=Coordinating committee in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS), Agr=Working Party on 
Agricultural Questions, Comp=Working Party on Competitiveness and 
Growth, Env=Working party on the Environment.
FIGURE 11  COMMITTEE-BASED 
COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN 
COOPERATION DENSITY
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Committee, PMG=Politico-Military Group, Tax=Working Party on 
Tax Questions, Jus=Coordinating committee in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS), Agr=Working Party on 
Agricultural Questions, Comp=Working Party on Competitiveness and 
Growth, Env=Working party on the Environment.
FIGURE 12  COMMITTEE-BASED 
COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN 
AVERAGE PATH LENGTH
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pairs of network members. herefore, average path length is 
commonly accepted as the key measure of network eiciency 
or network separation. Figure 12 reports our analysis of the 
average path length. 
First and foremost, we ind that average path length would 
be signiicantly increased after Brexit. his corroborates our 
indings about changes in closeness at the individual state 
level. Together, these results suggest that Brexit is likely to 
make the EU Council more separated and less eicient if 
the member states do not compensate Brexit with new ties. 
Second, as for changes to speciic committees, the Working 
Party on the Environment (Env), the Working Party on 
Tax Questions (Tax), and the Economic Policy Committee 
(EPC) tend to sufer most in terms of eiciency, quite 
similar to our indings about network density.
In conclusion, our analysis of the 11 committee and working 
group networks suggests that the post-Brexit EU would be 
sparser and less eicient. However, as discussed below, the 
actual outcome will depend on the strategies and actions of 
the remaining member states with respect to compensating 
the loss of the UK as a member.
11 Discussion
Brexit is likely to be a major chapter in the history of 
European integration. Clearly, the most important 
consequences will be for the UK itself, but losing one of 
its largest members is also a momentous event for the EU. 
Predictions are hard to make as to what the efects will be 
in terms of the functioning, efectiveness and outcomes of 
the decision-making processes, and the relative inluence 
between the remaining member states. 
he indings from this report indicate that some of the 
remaining member states will be more negatively afected 
than others, in terms of policy impact and network 
centrality during the negotiations in the Council of the EU. 
In particular, some smaller and medium sized Northern 
European states – Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the 
Netherlands – confront the toughest challenges with respect 
to defending their inluence in the Council. hese are the 
states with the closest network ties to the UK, and with the 
most similar policy positions. If (or when) the UK leaves, 
these states will need to increase their eforts in forming 
alliances with other member states, in order to defend their 
(often) liberal positions against pressure for higher subsidies 
and more regulations of the common market. he network 
positions of the remaining larger member states, on the 
other hand, and in particular France, Germany and Poland, 
are likely to be enhanced by Brexit. 
Our analyses also showed that the policy impact of Brexit 
is likely to be relatively modest. In most cases, excluding 
the UK from the bargaining game would not alter the 
position of the pivotal player. Furthermore, the outcome 
of the negotiations is often close to a weighted average 
of all member states positions. Given that the UK is but 
one (although important) of 28 member states, the overall 
impact of Brexit on the outcome is unlikely to be dramatic. 
Finally, we will also emphasise two important caveats with 
respect to the indings of this report. First, the analyses of 
the impact of Brexit on legislative outcomes is based on the 
best available data. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
DEU data does not include policy-issues from more recent 
years. However, we ind it unlikely that a newer sample of 
issues would have led to very diferent results in terms of 
the direction (more regulations, higher subsidies, further 
from Sweden’s position, closer to Spain’s) and the relatively 
modest impact of Brexit. Secondly, we study the efects of 
taking the UK out of historically existing processes and 
networks. We are unable to account for the fact that the 
remaining 27 member states may adjust their strategic 
behaviour in the event of Brexit. hus, our results are best 
viewed as indications of the challenges that the remaining 
states will need to address, rather than a precise prediction of 
what the state of the world post-Brexit will be. his applies 
both to the network analyses and the analyses of legislative 
decision-making. In the absence of the UK, Sweden and 
some other member states that are most afected may be 
compelled to invest more in the bargaining process to 
ensure that decision outcomes do not depart from their 
preferred positions.
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